1 data show a strong (conditional) correlation between life expectancy and democracy. This relationship is strongest for the decades of the 1960s and 1970s and is robust to controlling for the initial level of human capital as well as political histories. The data also suggest that health policy interventions are superior in democracies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss some background issues. In Section III, we present the results and the possible interpretations of these empirical …ndings. Section IV concludes.
II Background
Human history has witnessed remarkable increases in life expectancy alongside increases in prosperity. Preston (1975) showed that this relationship is non-linear with the largest gains in life expectancy being associated with increases in income per capita at low incomes. Crudely speaking, these increases in life expectancy can be traced to three factors. First, there are reductions in malnutrition and improvements in infrastructure such as clean water supply and improved sanitation facilities. Second, there is medical intervention through control (due to immunization and insecticides) and treatment of infectious diseases using antibiotics. Third, there are improvements in knowledge and lifestyle. All three of these are associated with increases in prosperity although the direction of causation is hard to establish. 2 Of particular importance in recent history is the increased use of insecticides and antibiotics which lead to remarkable increases in life expectancy in the post war period (see, for example, Gwatkin (1980) ). Preston (1975 and attributes the upward shift in the non-linear relationship between life expectancy and per capita income in the 20th century to social policy measures, especially vector control and immunization, undertaken in less developed countries. Deaton (2004) attributes this wave of mortality reduction which hit the third world after World War II to "the globalization of knowledge, facilitated by local political, economic, and educational conditions."(page 109). 3 The literature to date has focused more on the latter in ‡uences (education and economics) rather than the political foundations of increased life expectancy.
As a background, Figure 1 presents the"Preston Curve" for mid-way through our data period (1982) showing the link between life-expectancy and income per capita. The curve shown here is …tted non-parametrically. The Figure labels the democracies and autocracies di¤erently to get a feel for whether they have di¤erent levels of life-expectancy. The importance of controlling for income is apparent here as most very poor countries are autocracies while all very rich countries are democracies.
There are three main theoretical di¤erences between democracies and autocracies that we might expect to in ‡uence health issues. The …rst concerns representation. focus on who controls political o¢ ce, modeling autocracy as a dictatorship of the rich and democracy as a dictatorship of the poor or middle classes. On this view, health indicators will improve if public health is more of a priority for groups who dominate under a democracy compared to those who gain political in ‡uence in an autocracy. An e¤ect on health seems plausible on this view to the extent that the rich have less interest in public solutions to health problems. 4 A second view of the di¤erence between democracy and autocracy emphasizes accountability structures. Democracies demand accountability to a broad set of citizens at regular intervals whereas autocrats are accountable only to a smaller group such as the military. 5 Moreover, autocrats typically repress political opposition and the media to sti ‡e public policy debate. This view also predicts that greater attention will be paid to health issues in democracies since failure to do so should result in leaders being removed from o¢ ce -this link being weaker in autocracies.
A third di¤erence between democracies and autocracies concerns the process of political selection with democracies having stronger mechanisms for selecting competent and honest leaders to implement policy. To the extent that health interventions are supported by skilled and incorruptible political leaders, then democracies should lead to better health outcomes than autocracies.
There are con ‡icting views about whether democracy a¤ects policy and economic performance. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) review empirical research on the e¤ect of democracy on economic growth, concluding that the correlation is weak and not robust. Persson and Tabellini (2005) try a novel econometric approach …nding some support for the proposition that persistent democracy is associated with improvements in economic performance. 6 There is a small literature that looks at the relationship between life expectancy and democracy in cross-country data. Franco et al (2004) report a positive correlation between life expectancy and democracy. (See also Govindaraj and Rannan-Eliya (1994).) Lake and Baum (2001) relate democracy to a variety of public health interventions.
III Evidence
We use panel data across countries from the 1960s to the 2000s. 7 We begin by showing that there is a strong and robust link between life expectancy at birth and democracy after controlling for income. Our basic speci…cation uses data for every …fth year between 1962 and 2002. We estimate an equation of the form:
where h srt is some health indicator in country s in region r in year t, r is a region dummy variable, t is a year dummy variable, y srt is income per capita in country s in region r averaged over years t 4 to t, 8 and x srt are other (in practice time invariant) exogenous variables such as legal origins and political history. 9 The variables (d srt ; D srt ) are measures of democracy. The …rst is a contemporaneous measure denoting the fraction of democratic years between year t 4 and t while D srt is a longer-term one denoting the 6 See also Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) for the argument that democratization is associated with subsequent growth. 7 Our measure of democracy is from the Polity IV data base. Tables 1 to 3 . 8 As we know from the work of Preston (1975) and others, there is a strong correlation between income and life expectancy with a non-linear e¤ect. This is illustrated in Figure  1 . 9 Legal origin dummies e¤ectively control for the e¤ects of communist regimes on health outcomes (see Govindaraj and Rannan-Eliya 1994) as legal origin classi…cation includes socialist law. La Porta et al. (1999) …nd that legal origins are signi…cantly correlated with infant mortality and democracy. 4 fraction of democratic years since 1956 until year t. 10 The variable " srt is an error for which we compute robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
The main concern in interpreting results stems from the possibility that, as argued by Lipset (1959) , there are social and cultural factors that evolve and make it easier for democratic institutions to be supported. Thus:
srt + srt where z srt is a vector of factors that evolve and make it easier to sustain democratic institutions. If such factors exist, then we would spuriously attribute a direct e¤ect of democracy on outcomes that is really due to z srt . Table 1 presents the basic results. In column (1), we look solely at the partial relationship with contemporaneous democracy …nding that being democratic is associated with a 3.5 year increase in life expectancy. In column (2) we add income per capita measures. After controlling for income, the democracy e¤ect falls to around two years, but remains positive and significant. Column (3) adds the fraction of democratic years since 1956. The data suggest that it is more permanent democratic transitions that matter and the contemporaneous democracy e¤ect is no longer signi…cant, although an F-test indicates that the two democracy variables are jointly signi…cant. The point estimate suggests that a country that has been democratic for the whole period from 1956 through year t has a life expectancy that is more than …ve years higher than a country that has been autocratic since 1956. To put this in perspective, this point estimate "explains"3.5 of the 13.7 year life expectancy di¤erence between Ghana (democratic for 11 out of 47 years) and the U.S.A. (always democratic) in 2002. Column (4) reports the results for a di¤erent measure of democracy available due to Boix and Rosato (2001) . 11 The main results hold up in this case. 12 Column (5) 11 Boix and Rosato (2001) , who extend the democracy dataset constructed by Przeworski et al. (2000) , de…ne a country as a democracy if the following three conditions are satis…ed: (1) the legislature is elected in multiparty elections; (2) the executive is elected in a multicandidate election or elected by the legislature satisfying condition (1); (3) at least 50 percent of adult men have the right to vote. Compared to POLITY IV, this measure of democracy heavily depends on political contestation, putting less weight on political participation and on executive constraints. 12 The number of observations goes down since Boix and Rosato (2001)'s data covers 5 the result holds when we look at infant mortality rather than life-expectancy. It indicates that countries that have always been democratic since 1956 have fewer infants dying before reaching one year of age by about 17 per 1000 live births (about one-fourth of the sample mean) than countries that have been continuously autocratic since 1956. The remaining columns in Table 1 look at the possibility that democracy is correlated with pre-existing values and hence not picking up an institutional e¤ect. In column (6) we add measures of political history -speci…cally the fraction of years between 1900 and 1955 for which the country was democratic and the fraction of years in the same period for which the country was a colony. These are not signi…cant and the e¤ect of democratic years since 1956 remains. This holds true even if we allow the history to a¤ect the time trend in life expectancy in column (7) . Thus, it is di¢ cult to argue that we are picking up long lived di¤erences in values that are related to prior democratic experience.
Column (8) In Table 2 , we explore in greater detail where the democracy e¤ect is coming from. 13 First, we allow the democracy e¤ect ( 1 in equation (1)) to be di¤erent across time periods by estimating separate year e¤ects for democracies and non-democracies. The results reported in column (1) reveal that the signi…cant di¤erences obtain for the early part of our sample and disappear in the later period. Figure 2 plots the estimated year e¤ects only years until 1994. The number of countries in the sample goes down even though Boix and Rosato (2001), unlike POLITY IV, include the least populous countries, because countries for which income is observed only in the late 1990s in the Penn World Table are all dropped in column (4). 13 Note that we do not include the longer-term democracy variable, D rst , as a regressor in Table 2. 6 for democracies and autocracies. This shows that the upward trend in life expectancy disappear in the 1990s for both democracies and autocracies. These results are consistent with a view that the 1960s and 1970s were a key period in mortality decline (Gwatkin (1980) ), coupled with an additional observation that democracies were quicker to adopting mortality reducing technologies.
14 Column (2) of Table 2 shows that the democracy e¤ect is identi…ed primarily from middle and lower income countries as opposed to the very poorest and richest countries. This re ‡ects the fact that most very low income countries have tended to be autocracies and rich countries tend to be democracies so we simple observe no variation in these cases. 15 Table 3 explores in more detail the source of identi…cation. 16 The …rst column shows that the result is not robust to including country …xed e¤ects. 17 If most of the identi…cation is coming from cross-sectional di¤erences between countries that are permanent in nature, we will not …nd anything in the …xed e¤ects regressions. However, it could also be symptomatic of there being common omitted factors, such as culture and institutions, driving both democracy and life-expectancy. 18 We divide the sample into those countries that have been either continuously democratic or autocratic over the entire period (no regime change) and those that have switched at some point (switching regimes). Using the basic speci…cation, the original e¤ect shows up in both sub-samples as shown in columns (2) and (3). In column (4), we show that there is no e¤ect when we exploit only within-country variation in the group of countries that switched regime. Columns (5) and (6) show that, when we concentrate on those countries that have had a single democratic transition which has not subsequently been reversed, then we do get an e¤ect of being democratic once again. 19 In column (5), this is identi…ed solely from the 21 countries that have been in the data set throughout the period whereas column (6) is an unbalanced panel including, for example, some countries that were formed after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Table 4 looks for evidence of di¤erences in policy priorities between democracies and autocracies. 20 In columns (1) and (2), we investigate the di¤erence in sanitation and clean water supply between democratic and non-democratic countries. These two health infrastructures prevent deaths caused by diarrhea, typhoid, and cholera. We see that the percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities and improved water sources is higher by about 15 points (25 percent of the sample mean) and about 11 points (14 percent of the sample mean), respectively, in permanent democracies since 1956 than in permanent autocracies.
In columns (3) and (4), we explore the relationship between democracy and immunization. The latter is mostly a preventive measure against airborne infectious diseases. 21 We …nd that the percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months who received DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccination before the age of one is higher by about 9 points (more than 10% of the sample mean) in democracies compared to autocracies. For measles vaccination, democracy variables are not signi…cant while former colonies have lower immunization rates. 22 Finally, column (5) investigates the relationship between democracy and government health expenditures per capita (excluding expenditures on water and sanitation provision). The speci…cation is the same as in columns (3) and (4) with data being available for the year 2000 only. Here we …nd that the government in a permanent democracy during 1956 to 1995 spends around 160 dollars (in purchasing power parity terms) per person more on health than the one in a permanent autocracy. 23 In Table 5 , we undertake some further robustness checks by including exogenous variables that might be thought to a¤ect either the disease environment or the ease of public action. In column (1), we introduce the malaria ecology index of Kiszewski et al. (2004) . The higher this index, the more likely malaria is transmitted due to ecological factors. This is negatively correlated with life expectancy as we might expect. In column (2), we control for European settler mortality in the 19th century as in Acemoglu et al. (2001) . 24 This is correlated with lower life expectancy today though the magnitute is very small. 25 Column (3) includes the ethnic fractionalization index studied in Alesina et al. (2003) . 26 Higher ethnic fractionalization is correlated with lower life expectancy. 27 In column (4), we control for the incidence of armed con ‡icts using the Armed Con ‡ict Dataset by Gleditsch et al. (2002) . Wars are negatively correlated with life expectancy. Finally, column (5) adds the mineral exporter dummy (time-invariant), constructed from World Development Indicators, to the set of controls. 28 Mineral exporting countries have lower life expectancy. In all cases, the democracy e¤ect that we identi…ed in Table 1 remains signi…cant.
Finally, Table 6 looks at more disaggregated measures of democracy. Column (1) explores whether disaggregating democracies into presidential and parliamentary regimes yields di¤erential correlations with life expectancy. Column (2) does the same analysis for proportional representation and majoritarian electoral rules. In neither case is there a signi…cant di¤erence 23 The fact that countries that were democratic between 1900 and 1955 spend around 200 dollars more per capita than those that were continuously autocratic suggests that democratic experience may well be picking up long-lived cultural/political trends as well as health investments. 24 In their subsequent research, argue that European settler mortality is associated with the evolution of democracy as well as long-run economic development. 25 Settler mortality is measured as the number of deaths per 1000 settlers. 26 Aghion et al. (2004) theoretically argue that increased polarization of preference leads to the adoption of a Constitution in which political leaders are more insulated. They also …nd some empirical support for this claim by using the same index of ethnic fractionalization. 27 Alesina et al. (2003) …nd that infant mortality is higher in ethnically more fractionalized countries. 28 Ross (2001) provides a panel cross-country evidence that mineral exporting countries are more likely to be non-democratic. between these di¤erent forms of democracy. In column (5), we disaggregate democracy in POLITY IV's three sub-indices. There is suggestive evidence that the correlation driven by there being higher executive competition in democracies. However, given the relatively high correlations between these components, one should not "over-interpret"the signi…cance of this …nding.
IV Concluding Comments
Our results suggest that there is a robust correlation between democratic institutions and health, resulting in greater life expectancy in democracies. The results suggest that it is a pro-longed exposure to democracy that matters. However, without truly exogenous variation in constitutional di¤er-ences, the concern that this represents omitted cultural and social variables remains. Still, the fact that these results are robust to including education and political history as regressors is encouraging to the interpretation of this e¤ect as telling us something about the impact of institutions of policy making.
The results contribute to a growing body of the literature that takes political economy factors seriously in understanding human well-being. The challenge now is to take this agenda beyond broad cross-country comparisons and into the detailed workings of political and bureaucratic behavior under di¤erent systems of government. Table 5 for 1996 …gures), 2004 (Annex Table 6 for 1997), and 2005 (Annex Table 6 for 1998 to 2000), all downloaded at the World Health Organization website (http://www.who.int/whr/annexes/en/index.html). In order to separate the e¤ect of in ‡ation, these …gures are de ‡ated by the GDP de ‡ator obtained from the Penn World Table 6 .1 (by dividing nominal GDP per capita (variable CGDP) by real GDP per capita (variable RGDPCH)). These drop some observations of government health expenditures due to the lack of GDP data in the Penn World Table. Then the average over 1996-2000 is calculated.
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V.2 Democracy Variables
A country-year is treated as democratic if variable POLITY2 in the POLITY IV dataset version 2003 29 is more than zero 30 . This variable is missing if a country is not independent or occupied by foreign forces (for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, Cambodia during 1979-87, Lebanon since 1990, Syria during 1958-1960). We treat such a case as a colony, excluded from the sample, 31 although we use this information when we construct a political history variable (see below). Also note that the POLITY IV data excludes countries with the population of less than 500,000. This drops some countries with life expectancy observations (e.g. small island nations in the Caribbean).
We make adjustments to the POLITY2 variable for the following countries.
Burundi: Assign the value of 0 in 2002. POLITY 2 is missing for
Burundi in 2002 due to the regime transition. 32 We treat it as nondemocratic. 2003) de…ne country-years with POLITY2 equal to 8 or higher as "full democracies" and those with POLITY2 larger than 0 and less than 8 as "partial democracies". 31 Data on life expectancy and infant mortality is available for some countries during the pre-independence years or foreign occupation. We do not use such observations in the analysis in order to avoid confounding the e¤ects of autocracy and colonial rules. 32 Our short-term democracy measure for year t (DEMOCRACY since t-4 or d srt in equation (1)) is constructed by dividing the number of democratic years between years t 4 and t by …ve. Note that in this calculation, the years under colonial rules are included in the denominator. If a country became independent in, say, year t 1 and has been democratic for two years till year t, then DEMOCRACY since t 4 takes a value of 0.4.
The long-term democracy measure for year t (DEMOCRACY since 1956 or D srt in equation (1)) is constructed by dividing the sum of democratic years between years 1956 and t by t 1955. Note that for countries that have been democratic since its independence in the middle of the sample period (e.g. Papua New Guinea, which became independent in 1975) this measure is not 1 because they were not democratic but a colony until the year of independence. Note also that the long-term democracy measure is missing for Germany because East Germany was non-democratic while West Germany was democratic since 1956 until the uni…cation in 1990. 33 
V.3 Political History Variables
Political history variables are constructed by using the POLITY IV dataset for years 1900 to 1955. Note that these variables are missing for Germany and Yemen. East Germany had a di¤erent political history from West Germany 
V.4 Other Controls
INCOME, de…ned as real GDP per capita averaged over years t 4 to t (in thousand constant 1996 international dollars), is constructed as follows. Variable RGDPCH in the Penn World Table 6.1 34 is divided by 1000 to match with life expectancy, which is always a two-digit …gure, and then averaged over years t 4 to t. Unless observations are missing for all the …ve years, we keep observations and add them up and divide it by the number of available observations. 35 SCHOOLING, the average years of schooling in the population aged over 15, in 1960 is obtained from Barro and Lee (2000)'s dataset. 36 The variable name in the original dataset is TYR15. 37 Legal origin dummies (British, German, Scandinavian, Socialist) are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999) . 38 In addition, we treat the legal origin of East Timor (not included in La Portal et al (1999)'s analysis but included in our sample for Column (1) of Table 1 ) as French. 39 Region dummies are constructed according to the World Bank's region 34 Downloaded at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu 35 Several countries in the Penn World Table 6 .1 have observations only in 1996. For such countries, INCOME is not missing for years 1996 to 2000, with its value equal to per capita income in 1996. 36 Downloaded at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 37 We do not use the panel data set format …le downloadable on the website, because it drops some observations available in the original appendix tables of Barro and Lee (2000) . 38 The data …le is downloaded at Andrei Shleifer's website (http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html). 39 As the income data is not available, East Timor drops from the sample for other regressions.
According to CIA World Factbook 2005 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook), "UN-drafted legal system based on Indonesian law remains in place but will be replaced by civil and penal codes based on 
V.5 Variables not used for the AER Papers and Proceedings version
The alternative democracy measure is obtained from Boix and Rosato (2001) . Variable DEMOCRACY in their dataset is a dummy equal to 1 if a countryyear is democratic. We drop observations if variable SOVEREIGN (a dummy for independence) is 0. 40 We make the same adjustment to variable DEMOC-RACY for former Soviet Union republics, Czech and Slovak Republics, former Yugoslav republics, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Vietnam, North Korea and South Korea as described above. Then the short-term and long-term democracy measures are constructed exactly in the same way as above.
Malaria ecology index due to Kiszewski et al. (2004) is downloaded at Jeffrey Sachs's website. 41 The index measures the potential intensity of malaria transmission, uncolored by clinical externalities. The higher the index, the more intense the potential malaria transmission. The minimum value is zero while the maximum is about 31.55 (Burkina Faso).
European settler mortality in the 19th century is obtained from Appendix 42 It measures the probability that two randomly chosen persons in a country belong to di¤erent ethnic groups.
The incidence of wars is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the government of a country is a primary actor in a war (de…ned as armed con ‡icts with at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year). The data source is the Armed Con ‡ict Dataset Version 3-2005b (see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Strand et al. (2005) ), downloaded at its website. 43 The dummy variable is created so that it is equal to 1 if variable LOCATION in the monadic dataset is 3.
Mineral exporter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the gross value of mineral exports as percentages of GDP averaged over 1960-2002 is larger than 8 percent. The gross value of mineral exports as percentages of GDP is constructed as follows by using data obtained from World Development Indicators (September 2005). Fuel exports and ores and metals exports (as percentages of merchandise export) are each multiplied by merchandise exports (in current US dollars) and divided by GDP (in current US dollars). For Singapore, fuel exports is set at 0.01, following Ross (2001) . 44 Each of the resulting values is then averaged for each country over the period from 1960 (the earliest year in which the data is available) through 2002 whenever the data is available for at least one year. The mineral exporter dummy is set to be 1 if the sum of these two average values exceeds 8.
Forms of democracy variables used in Columns (1) and (2) of (1) and (2) of Table 6 . As in the construction of democracy measures, coding for Pakistan and Czechoslovakia is used for pre-independence years of Bangladesh and Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively.
The above coding procedure gives four dummy variables (two for forms of government, and two for electoral systems). Then for each of the four variables, we construct the long-term (since 1956) measures just as we did for the democracy measures (see above).
Dimensions of democracy variables used in Column (3) of Table 6 are constructed from the POLITY IV dataset. First, variables EXREC, XCONST, and POLCOMP are adjusted for Bangladesh and Czech and Slovak Republics as we did for variable POLITY2 (see above). We then make these variables missing if they are -66 (foreign occupation) so that missing country-years for these variables are the same as for variable POLITY2. 47 From these three variables, we construct three dummy variables as follows. EXECU-TIVE COMPETITION is a dummy variable coded as 1 if variable EXREC is 6 or higher. EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if variable XCONST is 4 or higher. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION is a dummy variable equal to 1 if variable POLCOMP is 7 or higher. Note that each of the three conditions for creating the dummy variables corresponds to the addition of a positive number to variable POLITY2. 48 As we de…ne democracy as having a positive POLITY2 score, this is likely to be the best, albeit admittedly crude, way of decomposing the measure of democracy by the POLITY IV dataset. Then for each of the three dummy variables, we construct the long-term measures in the same way as we did for the democ- See the data appendix for other variable definitions. Germany is dropped from the sample for columns (3) to (9) because it is difficult to construct DEMOCRACY since 1956. Yemen is dropped from the sample for columns (6) to (9) becuase it is difficult to calculate DEMOCRACY during 1900-1955 and COLONY during 1900-1955. The null for F -test is that coefficients on DEMOCRACY since t -4 and since 1956 are both zero. *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
